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This study is the ﬁrst to estimate the price elasticities of demand for both medical
rehabilitation programs and treatment at health spas. In Germany, the Statutory
Health Insurance (SHI) covers both forms of therapy if administered in authorized
medical facilities on referral from a physician. While health resort stays are prescribed
to recover from general symptoms of poor health and are preventive in character,
medical rehabilitation implies recovering from a speciﬁc illness or accident. From 1997
onwards, the German government more than doubled the copayments for both types of
health care services from DM 12 (e6.14) to DM 25 (e12.78) per day for those insured
under the SHI. Using longitudinal microdata from the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP), this exogenous price variation allows us to study the causal eﬀects
on demand, since we have a sound control group available. The data suggest that
pull-forward eﬀects in 1996 accounted for up to one-ﬁfth of the subsequent decrease in
demand. Taking this anticipation eﬀect into account, we show that the reform induced
a decrease in total demand of about 20 percent. We estimate the price elasticity for
rehabilitation programs that aim at preventing work incapacity to be about -0.15,
whereas the elasticity for rehabilitation programs for recovery from work accidents lies
around -0.30. In contrast, the price elasticity for treatment at health spas is elastic and
lies between -1 and -2.5.
Keywords: convalescent care, health spa, medical rehabilitation, price elastici-
ties, SOEP
JEL classiﬁcation: H51; I11; I18; J221 Introduction
How does the demand for medical care change when prices change? Since the early days of
the profession of health economics, the question of the price elasticity for health services
has been central. Alone Joseph P. Newhouse, one of the founders of the ﬁeld of health
economics, has published more than 100 articles on health care demand. Newhouse
was also the leader of the RAND group that designed and directed the famous RAND
Health Insurance Experiment that focused on the impact of cost-sharing on the demand
for medical care. Not only Newhouse but also many other renowned economists have
devoted a great deal of attention to this topic.
Many health economists have tried to causally link the level of cost-sharing to the
demand for individual health services or entire insurance plans. Most of the existing
studies use North American data from the 1960s, 70s, or 80s. Unfortunately, most of
these datasets are not even representative for the U.S. but are limited to individual cities,
counties, states, or speciﬁc health insurance plans. In a health insurance market like that
of the U.S., which is dominated by private insurance providers, it is extremely diﬃcult to
deal appropriately with health status related sorting into diﬀerent health plans. Another
issue is the poor comparability of the estimates, given that private health insurance
providers usually oﬀer plans that diﬀer with respect to deductibles, coinsurance rates,
stop-losses, and copayments. Studies relying on such a framework are forced to calculate
the change in demand as a response to a change in one or more of these parameters.
When making estimates with variations in two or more parameters comparable to those
where only one parameter is varied, it becomes necessary to extrapolate the results
making more or less strong assumptions.
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) remains the largest health policy
study in U.S. history until today. It was set up in 1971 and is still the methodological
“gold standard” when it comes to demand for health care. Families at six diﬀerent sites in
the U.S. were randomly assigned to 14 diﬀerent health insurance plans and observed for
up to ﬁve years (Manning et al., 1987). Besides concerns about higher refusal rates for
certain health plans and the generalizability to other health care systems and countries,
the biggest problem of this study is its age. After almost 30 years one might question the
extent to which the results apply to the present and to the behavior of insured people
today. Various authors have highlighted diﬀerent aspects of the experiment which are
documented in more than 300 publications, most of them from the 1980s (Zweifel and
Manning, 2000).
Convincing empirical evidence from countries other than the U.S. is very scanty.
In recent years, remarkably few studies have convincingly identiﬁed causal eﬀects and
accordingly derived elasticities (Chiappori et al., 1998; Cockx and Brasseur, 2003; Bishai
et al., 2008). In addition, there is surprisingly little evidence on the price elasticity of
1demand for preventive care, despite its potentially high relevance for public health. The
few existing studies suggest that these elasticities are higher than those for other medical
services, but, to the best of our knowledge, no study up to the present day has come
up with a concrete estimate (Roddy et al., 1986; Keeler and Rolph, 1988; Ringel et al.,
2002).
Most studies estimate the overall price elasticity of the demand for health services to
lie at around -0.2. Outpatient care is found to be more elastic than inpatient care, and
mental health care more price responsive than outpatient care. There is evidence that
price elasticities are higher in the short run than in the long run. Moreover, it has been
shown empirically and theoretically that elasticities are lower for more severe illnesses
and for more urgent care (O’Grady et al., 1985; Wedig, 1988; Keeler et al., 1988; Lee,
1995; Zweifel and Manning, 2000). However, since elasticities are most likely subject
to cultural inﬂuences, to diﬀerences in health care systems, and to change over time, a
conclusive answer to the question of how demand for medical care responds to variations
in prices is still lacking.
This study analyzes how an exogenous increase in the copayment rate for people
insured under the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) aﬀected the demand for medical
rehabilitation and treatment at health spas in Germany at the end of the 1990s. We
contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. Most importantly, this is the
ﬁrst study that provides price elasticity estimates for medical rehabilitation and treat-
ment at health spas. As only one single parameter is exogenously varied, elasticites are
computed without making further assumptions about other cost-sharing elements. Ad-
ditionally, this is one of the few European studies on health care demand, and it uses
recent and representative data for Germany, the largest country in Europe. Moreover,
it is noteworthy that selection into or out of the treatment is no issue in this context.
The majority of German citizens are compulsorily insured under the SHI system, which
provides free universal health care coverage. Germany also has a variety of independent
Private Health Insurance (PHI) providers for people in particular income and occupa-
tional groups. Strict legal regulations prevent switching between the SHI and the PHI
and thus make it impossible to switch out of the statutory system in response to reforms,
which guarantees a sound control group for this natural experiment.
Except for a daily copayment, the German SHI fully covers medical rehabilitation as
well as health spa treatments if prescribed by a physician and carried out in an authorized
medical facility. From 1997 onwards, the daily copayment rates for medical rehabilitation
programs and health spa treatments more than doubled for people insured under the SHI.
We show that this increase has led to an overall decrease in the demand for convalescent
care of around 25 percent. As the data suggest that pull-forward eﬀects in the year prior
to the reform are likely to have an eﬀect, the pure policy-induced decline in demand is
estimated to lie at around 20 percent. In consideration of these pull-forward eﬀects, we
2estimate the price elasticity for rehabilitation treatments that aim at preventing work
incapacity to lie at around -0.15. Moreover, we estimate the elasticity for rehabilitation
programs due to work accidents to be about -0.30. The elasticity of demand for physician-
prescribed health spa treatments, which can be classiﬁed as preventive care, is much more
price-responsive and is likely to lie between -1 and -2.5. To our knowledge, this is also
the ﬁrst attempt to compute price elasticities for preventive care, which is, according to
our estimates, price-elastic.
In the next section, we describe some features of the German health care system and
give more details about the reform. In Section 3, the dataset and the variables used are
explained, and in the subsequent section, we specify our estimation and identiﬁcation
strategy. Estimation results are presented in Section 5. We discuss the results afterwards
and conclude with Section 7.
2 The German Health Care System and the Policy Re-
form
The German health care system actually consists of two independent health care systems
existing side by side. The more important of the two is the Statutory Health Insurance
(SHI), which covers about 90 percent of the German population. Employees whose
gross income from salary is below a politically deﬁned income threshold (2007: e3,975
per month) are compulsorily insured under the SHI. High-income earners who exceed
that threshold as well as self-employed people have the right to choose among the SHI,
private health insurance, and remaining uninsured. Non-working spouses and dependent
children are automatically insured by the SHI family insurance at no charge. Special
groups such as students and unemployed people are subject to special arrangements, but
most are SHI-insured. Everyone insured under the SHI is subject to a universal beneﬁt
package which is determined at the federal level and codiﬁed in the Social Code Book V
(SGB V). Coinsurance rates are prohibited in the SHI and thus, apart from copayments,
health services are fully covered. The SHI is one pillar of the German social legislation
(German Ministry of Health, 2008).
The SHI is primarily ﬁnanced by mandatory payroll deductions which are not risk-
related. For people in gainful employment, these contributions are split equally between
employer and employee up to a contribution ceiling (2007: e3,562.50 per month). De-
spite several health care reforms that tried to tackle the problem of rising health care
expenditures, the contribution rates rose from 12.6 percent in 1990 to 13.9 percent in
2007 mainly due to demographic changes, medical progress, and system ineﬃciencies
(German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008).
The second track of the German health care system is Private Health Insurance
3(PHI). Private insurance providers primarily cover private sector employees above the
aforementioned income threshold, public sector employees, and the self-employed.1 Pri-
vately insured people pay risk-related insurance premiums determined by an initial health
checkup. The premiums exceed the expected expenditures in younger age brackets, since
health insurance providers make provisions for rising expenditures with increased age.
Coverage is provided under a range of diﬀerent health plans, and insurance contracts are
subject to private law. Consequently, in Germany, public health care reforms apply only
to the SHI, not to the PHI.
It is important to keep in mind that compulsorily insured persons have no right to
choose the health insurance system or beneﬁt package. They are compulsorily insured
under the standard SHI insurance scheme. Once an optionally insured (high-income or
self-employed) person opts out of the SHI system, it is practically impossible to switch
back to the SHI. Employees above the income threshold are legally forbidden from switch-
ing back, while employees who fall below the income threshold in subsequent years may
do so under certain conditions, but lose their provisions, which are not transferable (nei-
ther between PHI and SHI, nor between the diﬀerent private health insurance providers).
In reality, switching to a private health insurance provider may be regarded as a life-
time decision, and switching between the SHI system and PHI – as well as between PHI
providers – is therefore very rare.
The German Market for Convalescent Care
In Europe, and especially in Germany, there is a long tradition of seeking care in health
spas to recover from poor health. Since the time of the Roman Empire, “water cures”
have been recommended for various disorders. In Germany, spa treatments are usually
combined with various types of physical therapy, often including electrotherapy, massage,
underwater exercise, ultrasonic therapy, health and diet education, stress reduction ther-
apy, and cold and hot bath as well as mud applications. While spa therapies are usually
prescribed to people suﬀering generally poor health and are often largely preventive,
medical rehabilitation implies recovery from a speciﬁc illness or accident. In German,
both therapy forms are commonly referred to with the umbrella term Kur.
Apart from small copayments, the German SHI fully covers health spa treatment and
medical rehabilitation. However, both require a physician’s prescription, and the indi-
vidual has to submit an application for treatment to his or her SHI provider. The role of
1 We need to distinguish two types of employees in the German public sector. First, there are
civil servants with tenure (called Beamte), henceforth called “civil servants.” They are primarily PHI
insured as the state reimburses around 50 percent of their health expendiures (Beihilfe) and almost all
insure the non-reimbursable expenditures privately. Second, we need to consider employees in the public
sector without tenure (called Angestellte im öﬀentlichen Dienst). They have some privileges, too, but
are mostly insured with the SHI (under the same conditions as everyone else). We call them “public
servants.”
4the patient is the application process is central. On the one hand, well informed patients
may push their doctors to write favorable medical opinions, and doctors may comply
simply out of the fear of losing patients due to the free choice of medical practitioners
among the SHI insured. On the other hand, patients may not accept their doctor’s rec-
ommendation to go to a health spa or medical rehabilitation. After the application, the
SHI provider determines whether the preconditions for treatment have been fulﬁlled and
authorizes the therapy. The wording of the preconditions can be found in the German
social legislation, Social Code Book V (SGB V, article 23 para. 1, article 40 para. 1).
In general, approval of spa treatment requires that the patient is suﬀering a health con-
dition that is likely to lead to an illness or disability in the foreseeable future. Hence,
health spa therapies have a generally preventive character although the patient already
has health problems. Medical rehabilitation, by contrast, implies that an actual illness
exists. After authorization by the sickness fund, the prescribed treatment is provided in
an approved medical facility under contract by the SHI provider. These medical facilities
are usually located in scenic rural villages licensed by the state as Kurorte. For a village
to attain such a license, it needs to fulﬁll several conditions established in state laws:
extraordinarily clean air, seaside location, or mineral springs. The idea of providing pa-
tients a healthy change of environment is integral to the treatment program, and this is
also why such treatments are referred to as “inpatient.”2
The German SHI is one of the few health insurance systems that provides health
spa treatments to people in poor health but without any diagnosed illness. This is
in sharp contrast to most western health care systems, where visits to health spas are
mainly pleasure-oriented and paid completely out-of-pocket. Even medical rehabilitation
treatments are not always covered by private or public health insurance in other countries
but are subject to the beneﬁt catalog of the German SHI. Thus, it may come as no
surprise that the German market for convalescent care is said to be the largest worldwide,
at least when the booming wellness industry is not considered. In 1995, a total of e7.646
billion was spent on convalescent care, accounting for more than 4 percent of all health
expenditures in Germany (German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008). Almost e6 billion
thereof were spent by the SHI and the Statutory Pension Insurance (SPI). Around 1,400
medical facilities with 100,000 full-time (equivalent) staﬀ members treated 1.9 million
patients, who stayed 31 days each on average. The majority of these cases were medical
rehabilitation. Health spa treatment of individuals in the SHI system suﬀering poor
health, most of whom were retirees or family members of the insured, accounted for
300,000 cases (German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008).3
2 Nowadays, “outpatient” medical rehabilitation provided in the patient’s city of residence has become
increasingly prevalent. In the mid-90s, however, almost all rehabilitation in Germany was “inpatient,”
i.e., provided at a specialized medical facility in a Kurort. “Outpatient” health spa treatment also
entails traveling to a Kurort, but in this case patients do not stay overnight at the facility but rather in
a guesthouse of their own choice.
3 Another form of rehabilitation is what is known as vocational rehabilitation. Its purpose is to
5The German SPI is legally obligated to pay for medical rehabilitation treatments
that help to prevent permanent partial or total work disabilities. This is rooted in the
basic principle of “rehabilitation before pension” in the German social insurance system.
Thus, the SPI provides treatment for patients in gainful employment whose illness is
severe enough to threaten their ability to work. We will discuss the importance of this
funding principle in detail later on.
The Policy Reforms on Convalescent Care
At the end of 1996, the German government under Chancellor Kohl implemented two
health reforms that both aﬀected convalescent care programs. The ﬁrst is the focus of
this study. In West Germany as of January 1, 1997, copayments for inpatient health spa
stays and medical rehabilitation therapies were increased from DM 12 (e6.14) per day to
DM 25 (e12.78) per day. In East Germany, the copayments were increased from DM 8
(e4.09) to DM 20 (e10.23). This reﬂects an increase of 108 (150) percent.4 To illustrate
how drastic this copayment increase really was, we multiply the daily copayment rates
by the average length of stay according to the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (German Federal
Statistical Oﬃce, 2008). In West Germany, the absolute increase per treatment amounted
to around e300, and in East Germany, it was around e290. Before the reform and in
relation to the monthly net wages of those who received convalescent care in our sample,
the total copayment sum per treatment was 23 percent of the net wage in East Germany
and 26 percent in West Germany. After the copayment increase, the total copayment
sum per treatment approximately doubled to 50 (East) and 47 (West) percent of the
average monthly net wage.
The second law was intended to bring down the sickness absence rates and to prevent
moral hazard. The statutory replacement level for sickness spells up to six weeks was
reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone gross wages for employees. As
employees are eligible for sick pay during a health spa or medical rehabilitation treatment,
this law is believed to aﬀect the demand for convalescent care as well. Moreover, the
government allowed employers to deduct two days of paid vacation for every ﬁve days
that an employee was unable to work due to a convalescent care treatment.5
integrate disabled people into the labor market. However, since this form of rehabilitation was not
aﬀected by the reforms, it is outside the scope of this paper. Its overall importance is minor. In 2007,
only 68,100 cases were registered. Unemployment insurance (UI) provides the beneﬁts (Rauch et al.,
2008).
4 Passed on November 1, 1996 this law is entitled Gesetz zur Entlastung der Beiträge in der geset-
zlichen Krankenversicherung (Beitragsentlastungsgesetz - BeitrEntlG), BGBl. I 1996 p. 1631-1633. The
time that needs to elapse between two treatment episodes in order for the insured to be eligible again was
extended from three to four years, and the regular length of both therapy forms was reduced from four
to three weeks. Both changes were only eﬀective conditionally on the non-existence of severe medical
reasons for treatment. While the reduction of the regular length of stay is likely of negligible overall
importance, we will assess the impact of the shortening of the qualifying period in Section 5.
5 Passed on September 15, 1996, this law is entitled Arbeitsrechtliches Gesetz zur Förderung von
6We now identify and deﬁne subgroups that were aﬀected diﬀerently by the increase
in copayments, the cut in statutory sick pay, and the deduction of paid vacation. These
subgroups serve as treatment and control groups in the evaluation of this natural exper-
iment.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We see from Table 1 that subgroups (6) to (9) were completely unaﬀected by all three
legislative changes; all these groups are insured under the PHI, which is unaﬀected by SHI
copayment changes. Moreover, self-employed and non-working people are not eligible for
paid sick leave. Apprentices and public sector employees were exempted from the cut in
sick pay and the reductions in paid vacation, for political reasons. Consequently, these
subgroups serve later jointly as control group. We call them Control Group 1.
Subgroups (2) to (5) – SHI insured public sector employees, apprentices, self-
employed, and non-working respondents – also were not aﬀected by the cut in sick pay
and paid vacation. However, since they were insured under the SHI they were aﬀected by
the copayment increase. We use subgroups (2) to (5) to isolate the eﬀect of the increase
in copayments from the cut in compensation levels. The eﬀects can be disentangled
by comparing them to the SHI insured who work as employees in the private sector
(subgroup (1)) since they were aﬀected by all policy changes.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As Table 2 visualizes, we accordingly deﬁne three treatment groups and two control
groups. Treatment Group 1 incorporates all respondents who were subject to the co-
payment increase, the policy measure of key interest here. Hence Treatment Group 1
consists of all SHI insured, namely the subgroups (1) to (5). As some of these SHI insured
were also aﬀected by the cuts in sick pay and paid vacation (subgroup (1)), it is desirable
to isolate the diﬀerent reform eﬀects. We do so by deﬁning Treatment Group 2 as those
respondents who were only subject to the copayment increase (subgroups (2) to (5)).
In the subsequent sections, to estimate the net eﬀect of all policy changes, we contrast
Treatment Group 1 with Control Group 1, i.e., we contrast those who were aﬀected by
all reforms with those who were aﬀected by neither. To isolate the impact of the increase
in copayments, we contrast Treatment Group 2 – those who were solely aﬀected by the
copayment rise – with Control Group 1. Additionally, we contrast Treatment Group 3,
which is subgroup (1), with subgroups (2) to (5), to assess the impact of the cut in sick
pay and paid vacation on the demand for convalescent care.
Wachstum und Beschäftigung (Arbeitsrechtliches Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz), BGBl. I 1996 p.
1476-1479. The law became eﬀective on October 1, 1996. It should be noted that we are not able
to precisely identify those employees who were actually aﬀected by the cut in statutory sick pay, as
employers and unions voluntarily agreed to extend the old sick pay arrangement in some collective wage
agreements.
73 Data and Variable Deﬁnitions
Dataset
The empirical analysis relies on microdata from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP). The SOEP is an annual representative household survey that started in 1984
and sampled more than 20,000 persons in 2006. Wagner et al. (2007) provide further
details. Information on convalescent care treatments is only available for two post-reform
years. Hence, for the core analyses, we use data on waves 1995 to 1999, which include
time-invariant information, current information, and retrospective information about the
previous year. As the main dependent variables contain information about the year prior
to the interview, we employ data that is related to the years 1994 to 1998.6
We use the whole sample size except for respondents under the age of 18, who are
exempted from copayments. Moreover, we have to drop observations with missings on
the exogenous or endogenous variables.
Dependent Variables
The SOEP contains various questions about the usage of health services and the health
insurance. In total, we generate four dependent variables on the demand for convalescent
care programs. Our main dependent variable Rehab measures whether the respondent
went to a health spa or underwent an inpatient medical rehabilitation treatment in the
previous year: it takes the value one if that was the case, and zero if not. This variable
has been generated from the following question that was asked continuously from 1995
to 1999: “Were you admitted to a health spa or inpatient medical rehabilitation facility
last year?” In German, this question is even clearer because of the well-known umbrella
term Kur and the inpatient treatment this entails at a diﬀerent location, a Kurort, which
minimizes measurement errors. The fact that we do not know the exact time period of the
therapy does not severely hamper the analysis, even more so given that such treatments
are usually not carried out over Christmas or New Year’s. Hence, there should be no
doubt as to whether the therapy was in 1996 or in 1997.
By combining our main dependent variable with further questions, we generate ad-
ditional dependent variables that we employ in reﬁned model speciﬁcations. We call the
ﬁrst of the three Rehab due to illness. It takes the value one for respondents who have
6 If the respondent was interviewed in two subsequent waves, e.g., in 1994 and 1995, we match the
time-variant data from the ﬁrst year dealing with the current (ﬁrst) year with data from the second year
dealing with the ﬁrst year. For example, in 1995, respondents were asked about their current health
status but about their insurance status during the previous year. Hence, we use the 1994 information
on health status together with the 1995 data on insurance status if the respondent was interviewed in
both years.
8a one on their Rehab variable and who claimed that the SPI funded their treatment.7
Since we know that the SPI only funds rehabilitation to prevent people from becoming
unable to work, we thus capture only those employees who underwent such treatment.
Two more dependent variables are generated to measure the incidence rate of medical
rehabilitation therapies for recovery from work accidents (Rehab due to accident). Re-
spondents were asked whether they were admitted to a hospital or whether they received
medical treatment because of a work-related accident in the previous year.8 Hence, the
third dependent variable has a one for those employees who had a work-related acci-
dent that required a hospital stay and whose Rehab variable takes on the value one.
Analogously, a fourth variable with a one for respondents who claimed to have needed
medical treatment due to a work-related accident and with a one on their Rehab variable
is generated. In both cases it is very likely that those individuals underwent the med-
ical rehabilitation therapy due to the work-related accident. Even small measurement
errors would not be an issue as long as the reforms had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
measurement errors, which should not be the case. Appendix A displays the summary
statistics for all dependent variables.
Control Variables and Treatment Dummies
In our econometric speciﬁcations, we make use of various control variables. These control
variables capture personal and family-related characteristics such as age, female, immi-
grant, partner, or children. Moreover, we control for educational characteristics by using
data on the highest school degree obtained. An important determinant of the demand for
health spa and rehabilitation treatments is the health status of the respondents, which
we control for. We also include covariates that measure whether the person was employed
full-time, part-time, marginally, or non-employed, and additionally control for the gross
income per month. To capture time-invariant regional characteristics, we make use of
15 state dummies. Regional labor market dynamics are controlled for by the inclusion
of the annual state unemployment rate. Time trends are captured by year dummies. A
list of all covariates, their means and standard deviations can be found in Appendix A.
According to Table 2, we deﬁne three treatment dummies that mirror whether a
person belongs to Treatment Group 1, 2, 3, or to a control group. T1 takes on the value
one if the person belongs to Treatment Group 1 and zero if the person is in Control
Group 1. T2 also has a zero for those in Control Group 1 and a one for those belonging
to Treatment Group 2, whereas T3 takes on the value one when respondents are in
7 The exact SOEP question reads: “Who paid the greater part of the costs? a.) Statutory Pension
Insurance b.) Statutory Health Insurance c.) other organization.” As this question was only asked up to
1998, we cannot employ the 1999 wave in the models where this variable serves as a dependent variable.
8 The exact SOEP question reads: “Were you in the hospital or did you receive medical treatment
last year because of a work-related accident? a.) yes, received medical treatment b.) yes, went to the
hospital c.) no”
9Treatment Group 3 and zero when they are in Control Group 2. To estimate the causal
reform eﬀects, each of these treatment dummies enters the model speciﬁcation alone and
in interaction with a reform year dummy as will be explained in the next subsection.
4 Estimation Strategy
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
We would like to measure how the diﬀerent reform elements aﬀected the decision to go
to a health spa or to participate in a medical rehabilitation program. Thinking of the
policy intervention as a treatment, we ﬁt a probit model of the form:




where post97 is a dummy that takes on the value one for post-reform years and zero for
pre-reform years. T is representative for one of our three treatment dummies (see previ-
ous subsection). The interaction term between both dummies gives us the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences (DiD) estimator. To evaluate how the reform aﬀected our outcome variable,
henceforth, we always compute and display the marginal eﬀect of the interaction term
∆Φ(.)
∆(p97*D).9 Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distrib-
ution and ψ0 is a vector including all personal, educational, and job-related controls as
well as time dummies, state dummies, and the annual state unemployment rate.
Identiﬁcation
Our main identiﬁcation strategy relies on DiD estimation and hence on the assumption
of a common outcome variable trend for treatment and control groups in the absence
of the treatment. This assumption should hold conditional on all available controls. In
almost all natural experiments and non-randomized settings, controlling for a rich set
of covariates is important since control and treatment groups diﬀer signiﬁcantly with
respect to most of the observed characteristics. This is also true in our case, as Table
3 shows. In comparison to the control group, Treatment Groups 1 and 2 include more
females and immigrants, and the employees are less educated. Moreover, the people
in the Control Group have the best health, whereas those in Treatment Group 2 have




∆p97∆D is not of relevance in nonlinear models when the interest lies in the estimation of
a treatment eﬀect. Using treatment dummies, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated is given by
∆Φ(.)
∆(p97*T) = Φ(α+βpost97+γT+δDiD+ψ0ζ)−Φ(α+βpost97+γT+ψ0ζ) which is exactly what we
calculate and present throughout the paper.
10the worst. Treatment Group 3 is younger than the other subgroups and more likely to
have a partner and children. As by deﬁnition non-working respondents are not included
in Treatment Group 3, this group is much more likely to be employed full-time. The
heterogeneity of most of the observable characteristics is due to the federal regulations
of the German health insurance and hence unavoidable.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As can be seen from Table 4, the most important driver of the demand for health spa
and rehabilitation programs is health status. Not surprisingly, age also plays a role, as
well as gross wage. Immigrants are less likely to go to a health spa, probably because of
information asymmetries. Note that a clear downward trend in post-treatment years is
captured by the post97 dummy.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Since we are able to control for these characteristics, diﬀerences in the variables’ levels
in the diﬀerent subgroups pose no problem, even if related to the outcome, as long as
the diﬀerences do not change over time. Put diﬀerently, it is important that there are
no unobservables that might have produced diﬀerent dynamics for the treatment and
control groups. We argue that this key assumption, which is common to all DiD studies,
does hold. Again, we are in the position to adjust the sample composition for various
personal, educational, and job-related characteristics of the respondents. We also control
for time eﬀects, persistent state diﬀerences, and the annual state unemployment rate.
Hence, it is diﬃcult to think of unobservables that might have aﬀected the outcomes of
treatment and control groups diﬀerently. Moreover, we experiment with diﬀerent time
spans and consider panel attrition by using the panel structure of the data. For example,
using a balanced panel in addition to an unbalanced panel, we assess the sensitivity of
the results. A similar robustness check is performed by weighting the regression with
the inverse probability of not dropping out of the sample in post-reform years. Another
piece of evidence for the absence of distorting unobservable eﬀects is the nonsigniﬁcance
of placebo reform estimates for years without a reform. We will make use of these
methods later on.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the outcome variable for the diﬀerent treatment
groups and the controls over time.10 Even without the correction for observables, we
observe a distinct parallel evolution for all four groups during the pre-reform years.
10 As will be shown later, it is likely that due to the announcement of the reform at the end of 1995,
anticipation eﬀects play a role. Hence, the two uncontaminated pre-reform years 1994 and 1995 are
contrasted to the two post-reform years 1997 and 1998.
11After the reform implementation, the ratio of controls with convalescent care therapies
remained stable, whereas we observe a clear and distinct, but parallel, decrease for all
three treatment groups.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In recent years, there has been an extensive debate about the drawbacks and limitations
of DiD estimation. A particular concern is the underestimation of OLS standard errors
due to serial correlation in the case of long time horizons and unobserved (treatment and
control) group eﬀects. To deal with the serial correlation issue, we focus on short time
horizons. As Bertrand et al. (2004) have shown, the main reason for the understating
of standard errors is rooted in serial correlation of the outcome and the intervention
variable and is basically eliminated when focusing on less than ﬁve periods. While there
is consensus about the serial correlation problem, the issue with unobserved common
group eﬀects is more of a controversial subject of debate. If one takes the objection of
Donald and Lang (2007) seriously, then it would not be possible to draw inferences from
DiD analyses in the case of few groups, meaning that no empirical assessment could be
performed. We subscribe to the view of Wooldridge (2006) who refers to that as (p. 18):
“DL [Donald and Lang] criticize Card and Krueger (1994) for comparing mean wage changes of fast-food
workers across two states because Card and Krueger fail to account for the state eﬀect (New Jersery or
Pennsylvania) [...]. But the DL criticism in the G = 2 case is no diﬀerent from a common question raised
for any diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analyses: How can we be sure that any observed diﬀerence in means is
due entirely to the policy change? To characterize the problem as failing to account for an unobserved
group eﬀect is not necessarily helpful.”11
Alongside our focus on short time spans to resolve serial correlation concerns, we use
robust standard errors and correct for clustering at the individual level throughout the
analysis.
A crucial issue in most studies that try to evaluate policy reforms is, besides the
absence of a control group, selection into or out of the treatment group. We can cope with
concerns about selection since we are in the fortunate position of having a framework in
which two almost totally independent health care systems exist side by side, as explained
11 In this very readable extended version of an older published AER paper (Wooldridge, 2003),
Wooldridge (2006) discusses several other shortcomings and assumptions of the estimation approach
proposed by Donald and Lang (2007). At another juncture, Wooldridge (2007) asks rhetorically whether
introducing more than sampling error into DiD analyses was necessary, or desirable. “Should we con-
clude nothing can be learned in such settings?”, he questions (p. 3). Moreover, he uses the well known
Meyer et al. (1995) study, which is similar to ours and also obtains marginally signiﬁcant results, as
another example: “It seems that, in this example, there is plenty of uncertainty in estimation, and
one cannot obtain a tight estimate without a fairly large sample size. It is unclear what we gain by
concluding that, because we are just identifying the parameters, we cannot perform inference in such
cases. In this example, it is hard to argue that the uncertainty associated with choosing low earners
within the same state and time period as the control group somehow swamps the sampling error in the
sample means.” (p. 3 to 4).
12in Section 2. On the one hand, this provides a well deﬁned control group. On the other
hand, we do not need to fear that reform-induced selection has distorted the results, as
there is virtually no switching between the SHI and the PHI, and since all SHI-insured
persons are covered by universal health plans. Due to strict German regulations, a switch
to the PHI was only legally allowed for a small fraction of optionally SHI insured, and
we are able to identify and exclude these cases when running robustness checks.
Individuals insured under the SHI who were for some reason exempted from copay-
ments are not identiﬁable. For example, people whose annual copayments for pharma-
ceuticals, health care services, or medical devices exceeded a certain percentage of their
disposable household income could have applied for a case of hardship.12 However, at
that time, the Association for Health Resort and Rehabilitation Therapy claimed that
the exemption clauses were widely unknown to the public and thus we believe that they
do not downwardly bias our results severely.
Furthermore, we need to consider the possibility of pull-forward eﬀects. Health spa
treatment or rehabilitation is usually planned several months or even years in advance.
Certainly, health spa stays are easier to schedule than rehabilitation. Since the ﬁrst
policy reform plans were made public at the end of 1995 (Handelsblatt, 1995), it may be
that a signiﬁcant portion of the SHI insured attended health spa or medical rehabilitation
programs in 1996 instead of 1997. We address this issue by including and excluding the
year 1996 in the analyses.
To be able to fully attribute changes in the incidence rates to changes in the demand
for health spa and medical rehabilitation programs, supply side eﬀects should not play
a role in this context. We have not found indications of supply-side constraints. In
contrast, there have been reports about the deepest crisis in the market for convalescent
care since the end of the Second World War (Handelsblatt, 1998). Dozens of medical
facilities and health spas had to close and, hence, there is strong evidence that there was
excess of supply. This is also supported by oﬃcial statistics stating that the utilized bed
capacity of all facilities strongly decreased, from 83.2 percent in 1996 to 62.3 percent in
1997 (German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008).
Admittedly, it may have been that, due to rising awareness and increased political
pressure, the SHI and the PHI were more restrictive in their authorization of therapy
programs during the period when the reforms were under political discussion. We address
this possibility by excluding 1996 in several model speciﬁcations.
One point that may hamper our identiﬁcation strategy results from the design of
the data. As the respondents were not asked directly about the medical reasons for
the therapy, we can only indirectly identify speciﬁc treatment forms. As described in
Section 3, we combine the general question about convalescent care therapy with the
12 The usual threshold is 2 percent of disposable household income; for people with chronic diseases
it is 1 percent.
13more speciﬁc question about the funder of the therapy. Thanks to the general and clear
principle in the German social legislation that the SPI only funds medical rehabilitation
treatments that are necessary to prevent work incapacity, we are able to identify this
type of therapy. While the identiﬁcation of this therapy form is well-deﬁned, we need
one assumption to identify another speciﬁc form of rehabilitation therapy: we plausibly
assume that respondents who had a work-related accident requiring medical treatment
and were prescribed convalescent care therapy in the same year did in fact receive the
therapy due to the accident. In this context, we have to point out that, in our sam-
ple, the number of respondents who belong to Control Group 1 and who underwent
medical rehabilitation due to a work-related accident is so small that we cannot use
this group. Hence, we discard the controls in this sub-speciﬁcation and rely solely on
Treatment Group 1 to obtain a suﬃciently large sample size. This before-after estimator
relies on the assumption that the demand for this speciﬁc treatment remained constant
for Control Group 1, which seems to be a reasonable assumption given Figure 1. For
both speciﬁc forms of treatment – rehabilitation due to illness and rehabilitation due
to work-related accidents – the daily copayments increased considerably. Hence, we can
accurately attribute post-reform changes in demand to reform-induced exogenous price
variations.
Due to various methodological issues, to the best of our knowledge, never before
has it been possible to compute an elasticity estimate for preventive care. As health
spa treatments can be categorized as a form of preventive care, we make an attempt to
compute an elasticity estimate. Unfortunately, we cannot directly identify such treatment
forms. However, we know how the total demand for convalescent care reacted to the
copayment increase and we know from oﬃcial data that health spa treatments accounted
for 15.13 percent of all convalescent care therapies. Since we also know the fraction of
medical rehabilitation treatments and can directly identify and calculate the reform
eﬀects for these treatments, we can derive and indirectly calculate price elasticities for
health spa stays. More details about the assumptions that lead to the upper and lower
bound elasticity estimates can be found in Section 5.
As a last point, we would like to emphasize that our identiﬁcation strategy relies
on diﬀerent model speciﬁcations according to our main outcome measures: convalescent
care treatments, rehabilitation treatments due to illness, rehabilitation treatments due
to work accidents that required a hospital stay, and rehabilitation treatments due to
work accidents that required medical treatment but no hospital stay. Additionally, the
ﬁrst two of these model speciﬁcations are estimated by including three diﬀerent treat-
ment dummies representing diﬀerent subpopulations that were aﬀected diﬀerently by the
reforms. This setup guarantees the results to be based upon various pillars, with each
based on distinct underlying exogenous price variations. Hence, the identiﬁcation of the
reform eﬀects is supported by a broad strategy. By crosschecking, the plausibility and
14sensitivity of our results is automatically veriﬁed.
5 Results
We have already examined Figure 1 in the previous subsection. It displays the un-
conditional incidence rates for convalescent care treatments by treatment and control
groups. While the ratio of the treated decreased sharply after the implementation of
the policy reforms, it remained fairly stable for the controls. Note that the incidence
rates for all three treatment groups developed in a remarkably parallel manner over the
whole period, while the incidence rates for treated and controls show a parallel pattern
only for the pre-treatment periods. This reinforces the plausibility of the common time
trend assumption and points strongly towards causal reform eﬀects. Averaging over the
pre- and post-reform years for Treatment Group 1 and Control Group 1 and taking
the unconditional double diﬀerence yields a raw DiD estimate of about -1.5 percentage
points.
Table 5 shows the regression results when probit models like in equation 1 are es-
timated using a pooled sample. Since the coeﬃcient of interest, displayed as DiD, is
insensitive to the stepwise inclusion of sets of covariates, we present the full speciﬁca-
tions throughout the rest of the section. Marginal eﬀects are always displayed.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Columns one to three incorporate the years 1994 to 1998, whereas in columns four to six,
the pre-treatment year 1996 is omitted due to potential anticipation eﬀects. Column one
shows estimation results when we include T1 as treatment dummy and thus contrasts all
those who were aﬀected by any reform element with those who were entirely unaﬀected
by the reforms. We ﬁnd that the reforms led to a signiﬁcant decrease in the incidence
rate of convalescent care treatments by 1.2 percentage points. The absolute decrease is
slightly higher (-1.36 percentage points) when we compare SHI insured who were only
exposed to the increase in copayments to the control group (column two). On the other
hand, the speciﬁcation in column three, which compares those who were aﬀected by all
policy changes with those who were aﬀected only by the increase in copayments, does not
provide evidence that the cut in sick pay and vacation days had any signiﬁcant additional
eﬀect.
Columns four to six reinforce the previous results: the increase in copayments has
induced a signiﬁcant decrease in the incidence rate of health spa and medical rehabilita-
tion treatments of about 1 percentage point (column ﬁve). However, we ﬁnd no evidence
that the cut in sick pay and paid vacation led to a decrease in either type of treatment
(column six).
15Interestingly, if we do not consider the year prior to the reform, 1996, the magnitude
of the decrease is approximately 0.25 percentage points or around 20 percent lower,
which suggests that pull-forward eﬀects may have occurred. When related to the average
incidence rates in the pre-treatment periods, the purely copayment-induced percentage
point decreases translate into overall decreases by 1.36/5.02 = 27 percent for all years
and 1.09/5.18 = 21 percent for the speciﬁcation without 1996.
To investigate whether a change in the composition of the sample size may have
confounded our results, we balance the sample and restrict it to respondents who were
successfully interviewed in all years and have valid information on their variables. The
residual buildup of Table 6 is the same as in Table 5. The same picture as before appears.
We ﬁnd that the reforms induced a signiﬁcant decrease of 1.25 percentage points when
all those who were exposed to any reform element are compared to Control Group 1
(column one, use of T1). The decrease shrinks about 0.20 percentage points when we
do not consider 1996 (-1.07, column four). This is also true when we contrast those who
were only aﬀected by the copayment increase to those who were totally unaﬀected (-1.53
vs. -1.35 percentage points, columns two and ﬁve). Again, we ﬁnd no evidence that the
cut in sick pay and the deduction of vacation days had any eﬀect (columns three and
six).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We now estimate how the reforms aﬀected medical rehabilitation programs for working
people who without treatment would run the risk of becoming unable to work. The
SPI funds these programs, and we have information on who funded the therapy for the
years 1994 to 1997. Hence, columns one to three in Table 7 display the regression results
when we analyze respondents who indicated that the treatment was paid by the SPI. We
ﬁnd marginally signiﬁcant but substantially lower eﬀects of -0.26 and -0.21 percentage
points when Treatment Groups 1 and 2 are contrasted to Control Group 1 (columns one
and two). Again, we ﬁnd no evidence that cuts in sick pay and paid vacation had any
signiﬁcant eﬀect on top of the copayment-induced decrease (column three).
It should be noted that the power of the statistical tests clearly decreases due to
smaller sample sizes for the reﬁned speciﬁcations. However, in contrast to column three,
the coeﬃcient in column one is signiﬁcant at the 8 percent level and the one in column
two is signiﬁcant at the 18 percent level. We take this as evidence that it is solely the
sample size that caused the p-values to decrease in comparison to Tables 5 and 6.
Since we also have information on whether the employee had a work-related accident
in the corresponding year, we now consider people who answered the Rehab and the
Work Accident question with “yes.” By this means, we estimate how the reforms aﬀected
medical rehabilitation treatments due to work accidents. Furthermore, we diﬀerentiate
16whether the work-related accident required a hospital stay or only outpatient medical
treatment. This comes at the cost of losing the control group, as too few respondents in
these subgroups meet these criteria. As most of the employees with work accidents and
rehab stays are in subgroup (1), we use Treatment Group 1 for these speciﬁcations. As
we have already seen that the results are more or less identical irrespective of whether
we use Treatment Group 1 or 2, the focus on Treatment Group 1 should not make a
major diﬀerence. Discarding the controls and relying on simple before-after comparisons
is equivalent to the assumption that the demand for work accident-related rehabilitation
treatments remained constant over time. Figure 1 is indicative that this is a realistic
assumption.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Column four of Table 7 gives us a marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of -0.038 percentage
points, and according to column ﬁve, the reform induced a signiﬁcant decrease of -0.07
percentage points. Note that the strength of the decrease is not comparable between
the speciﬁcations as the average incidence levels diﬀer between the speciﬁcations. For
example, the overall incidence rate for rehabilitation due to work accidents with hospital
stays for Treatment Group 1 and the pre-reform period was 0.148 percent leading to a
reform-induced decrease in demand of around 25 percent. Despite the smaller sample
size, the estimated reform eﬀects for these speciﬁc therapy forms are very plausible and
the decreases in percent are remarkably similar to the ones in our main speciﬁcations in
Table 5.
In Table 8, we present additional model speciﬁcations to prove the consistency and
robustness of our results. Therefore, we limit the analysis to the comparison of Treatment
Group 2 with Control Group 1, e.g., we always estimate the “pure” copayment eﬀect.
Column one gives the estimation result when the period under consideration is shortened
to two years and thus represents the short-run impact of the reform, anticipation eﬀects
included. Consequently, the reform eﬀect is higher and -1.8 percentage points.
To deﬁnitely exclude the possibility that selection into or out of the treatment dis-
torted our results, we drop the only group that had the option to change the health
insurance system, namely that of optionally insured people. We see that the estimates
almost perfectly ﬁt our basic results as the reform eﬀect of the copayment increase is
estimated to be -1.25 percentage points.
In addition to the balanced estimates, we show that panel attrition is of no issue
in column three, which weights the same regression as in column two of Table 5 with
the inverse probability of not dropping out of the sample in the post-reform period. The
point estimate is highly signiﬁcant and of the same magnitude as before (-1.27 percentage
points). In this context, it is worth mentioning that, conditional on all other covariates,
17convalescent care treatments are not signiﬁcantly related to the probability of dropping
out of the sample in the post-reform period (Coef.: 0.010, Std. Err.: 0.044).
We also try to diﬀerentiate by severity of illness by dropping respondents who spent
either more or less than seven nights in the hospital during the year of their rehabilitation
treatment (columns four and ﬁve). We ﬁnd that the percentage point decrease is almost
twice as large for those who stayed in the hospital less than one week (-0.92** vs. -0.55
percentage points [p-value: 0.1125]).
Although we cannot identify which speciﬁc convalescent care programs were funded
by the SHI, we ﬁnd a plausible 1.19 percentage point decrease (base incidence level:
2.9 percent) for these programs. Finally, restricting the sample to West Germans leads
to a highly signiﬁcant 1.48 percentage point reform-induced decline. All in all, these
robustness checks are notable insofar as every one of these speciﬁcations ﬁts our main
results and is in line with the literature.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
As a ﬁnal check to ultimately corroborate the common time trend assumption, we present
placebo estimates for the years 1995 and 1996. That is, we pretend as if the reform had
become eﬀective in 1995 or 1996. If any signiﬁcant reform eﬀects arose, the assumption
of a common time trend for treatment and control group in the absence of the treatment
would be seriously challenged. However, as Table 9 demonstrates, this is not the case.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Price Elasticities of the Demand for Convalescent Care
Using the estimates from the previous subsection, we calculate arc price elasticities of
demand for various convalescent care programs according to
εq,p =
(q1 − q0)/¯ q
(p1 − p0)/¯ p
(2)
where q1 represents the incidence rate of the program for post-reform years and p0 stands
for the pre-reform copayment rate. ¯ q and ¯ p are average values over all years.
To compute the overall change in demand, we rely on the estimates for the pure
copayment eﬀect in Tables 5 and 7. The numerator of the elasticity formula is obtained
by plugging in the estimated percentage point decrease in demand and relating it to the
average incidence level over all years. For example, for the most general speciﬁcation
18with all years in Table 5, we would obtain a copayment-induced demand decrease of
1.36
4.48 ∗ 100 = 30.36 percent.
Concerning the denominator, we calculate the change in daily prices as
(25−12)
(25+12)/2 =
+70.27 percent in West and
(20−8)
(20+8)/2 = +85.71 percent in East Germany and consider
by simple weighting that 18.8 percent of all treatments were received by East Ger-
mans between 1994 and 1998 (German Statutory Pension Insurance, 2008). Moreover,
when computing the overall elasticities, we take into account that 8.14 percent of all
convalescent care programs were outpatient health spa programs, which were not af-
fected by the copayment increase. For example, the overall elasticity for convalescent
care programs using estimates for the years 1994 to 1998 is computed according to
εq,p = −30.36
0.919∗(0.812∗70.27+0.188∗85.71) = −0.45.
Another, so far neglected, reform element is likely to have partially driven the decrease
in the incidence rates. Given the lack of compelling medical arguments against it, the
period of eligibility for cost coverage between two treatments was raised from three to
four years over the course of the reforms. This change applied to all forms of convalescent
care programs. Under the assumption that a fraction of insured people are well-informed
and take advantage of the possibility to receive treatment on a regular basis, we would
overestimate the copayment-induced decrease in demand and thereby the elasticities.
The data reveal that, indeed, around 20 percent of the average users of these treat-
ment programs are regularly prescribed treatment according to the legally deﬁned min-
imum time intervals. For example, an SHI insured who was prescribed treatment in
1990 is not eligible again for another treatment until at least three years had passed,
unless a necessary medical reason arises. Taking all SHI insured, i.e., subgroups (1) to
(5) in Table 1, 17.8 percent of those who were prescribed a convalescent care treatment
in 1990 underwent such a therapy again in 1993 or 1994 but neither during the quali-
fying period after the ﬁrst treatment nor during the qualifying period after the second
treatment.13 This number is conﬁrmed if we take those who were in treatment in 1991
and again in 1994 or 1995 without having been in therapy in between. In total, 17.8
and 16.9 percent of those who were in therapy in 1990 and 1991, respectively, underwent
treatment again after approximately three years. This also means that their illness was
not severe enough for a freely chosen physician to certify that urgent medical reasons
would justify another treatment before the end of the waiting period. Hence, we take
these numbers as evidence that around 20 percent of all administered convalescent care
treatments are received by patients who know their rights very well and who participate
in convalescent care programs on a regular basis. Note that the suspicion of a signiﬁcant
degree of moral hazard in the convalescent care market was one central argument for
doubling the copayments; ex-ante, experts estimated that around a quarter of all treat-
13 We do not have data for the year 1992. To obtain the numbers, we condition on those respondents
who answered the questionnaire in the years 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, and 1996.
19ments were unnecessary (Schmitz, 1996; Sauga, 1996). Also remember that according
to our estimates, around 20 percent of the overall decrease in demand is attributable to
pull-forward eﬀects. These numbers ﬁt quite nicely to the estimated proportion of well-
informed regular convalescent care program users. This group is likely to be responsible
for the bulk of the anticipation eﬀect and the large degree of moral hazard in the market.
The plausibility and complementarity of these numbers are additional pieces of evidence
for the consistency of our estimation and identiﬁcation strategy.
Given that we have information about two post-reform years, the prolongation of
the qualifying period prevented one year-fraction of well informed people from attending
therapy in these two post-reform years. Hence, when calculating the copayment-induced
demand decrease, we subtract 10 percent of the average incidence rate from the estimated
percentage point decrease. In the example above, this would mean that the numerator
would be −1.36+0.1∗4.48
4.48 = −20.36 percent leading to an elasticity of -0.30 instead of -0.45.
However, to account for measurement inaccuracy and to establish our estimates on a
broad basis, we always display both values, which could be interpreted as upper and
lower elasticity bounds.
Table 10 emerges. We diﬀerentiate between estimates where all years from 1994 to
1998 are considered and estimates without the year 1996 to make allowance for pull-
forward eﬀects. Additionally, row three shows estimates for West Germany that might
be more precise as we do not have to weight the price increases according to the overall
East/West incidence rate of convalescent care programs. Another argument for separate
West elasticities would be that East Germans might have reacted diﬀerently to the
reforms only seven years after reuniﬁcation. On the other hand, the precision of the
estimates decreases due to a smaller sample size.
Column one shows the overall price elasticities for all convalescent care programs;
the calculations are based on the estimates in Table 5 (columns one and four). We
estimate the overall price elasticity to lie between -0.30 and -0.45 for the years 1994 to
1998 and -0.22 and -0.34 without considering 1996. For West Germany without 1996,
the bounds are -0.32 and -0.42. Column two shows substantially lower estimates for
rehabilitation treatments due to illnesses that threaten the employees’ work capacity.
The price elasticity is around -0.15 for this type of therapy (-0.25 for West Germany).14
Medical rehabilitation programs that were prescribed to recover from a work-related
accident and required a hospital stay are calculated to lie between -0.22 and -0.34 for all
of Germany as well as -0.32 and -0.45 for West Germany (without 1996). If the work
accident led to medical treatment but no hospital stay, the elasticity is around -0.30.
All elasticities are of a reasonable and overlapping range and show the same general
14 Due to space limitations, in the previous subsection, we have not presented estimates for medical
rehabilitation due to illness and work accidents without considering 1996. These estimates, which are
used to calculate some of the presented elasticities as well as the detailed estimates for West Germany,
are available from the authors.
20pattern. We always ﬁnd that the computed elasticities without considering 1996 are
lower, which implies strong evidence for anticipation eﬀects. Moreover, the estimated
elasticities for West Germany are of the same range as the overall elasticities but are a
little bit larger throughout all speciﬁcations.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
As already mentioned in Section 4, we can only indirectly calculate the price elastici-
ties for health spa programs and need to make further assumptions. Hence, we present
broad upper and lower bound estimates which we obtain under the following assump-
tions. First, it is implicitly assumed that we can perfectly identify and calculate the
copayment-induced decrease in demand for rehabilitation treatments. This is, however,
not the case as we can only identify rehabilitation treatments that are funded by the
SPI and aim at preventing work incapacity. Beside these programs, there also exist re-
habilitation therapies that are funded by the SHI for recovery from less severe illnesses
or accidents. The SHI also funds rehabilitation programs for retirees. Second, as we can-
not directly identify the demand for health spa programs, we are unable to directly test
whether the cut in sick pay and paid vacation aﬀected the demand for health spa thera-
pies. However, we solely consider estimates for Treatment Group 2, i.e., those who were
only aﬀected by the cut in copayments, to indirectly calculate the elasticities for health
spa programs. Third, we rely our calculations on data from the German Federal Statis-
tical Oﬃce (2008) stating that between 1994 and 1998, health spa programs accounted
for 15.13 percent of all convalescent care programs. Outpatient health spa programs, for
which no copayments were raised, made up 8.14 percent. Back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions under consideration of the decrease in total demand for convalescent care and the
decrease in demand for rehabilitation programs to prevent work incapacities result in a
reform-induced decrease in total demand for health spa programs of 67.9 percent. If we
fully attribute this decrease in demand to the copayment increase for inpatient health
spa programs which made up 46.2 percent of all health spa programs (German Federal
Statistical Oﬃce, 2008), we end up with an overall elasticity of about -2.5. For the rea-
sons mentioned above and given the wide lack of knowledge that can be assumed among
the insured, this should be regarded as an upper bound estimate. The German media
tended to give the impression that the increase in copayments aﬀected all types of Kur
and did not explain that outpatient health spa treatment was not aﬀected. Hence, we
compute a lower bound elasticity for health spa treatments, attributing the total decrease
in health spa demand to all health spa programs, ending up with an estimate of around
-1. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that in contrast to rehabilitation programs, the
price elasticity for health spa therapies, which can be classiﬁed as preventive health care,
is elastic.
216 Discussion
In the previous sections, we have shown by means of various model speciﬁcations and
robustness checks that the German health reforms of 1996 decreased the demand for
health spa and medical rehabilitation programs by around one percentage point through-
out Germany. This corresponds to an overall decrease in demand of approximately 20
percent.
It should be kept in mind that we estimate the average treatment eﬀect on the
treated in each speciﬁcation, i.e., the reform eﬀects for the subsample under consider-
ation. Hence, the external validity of our results might be questioned. However, our
sample is representative of the German population. Table 1 and 2 show that Treatment
Groups 1 and 2 consist of subgroups that are each representative for Germany. The
subgroups may diﬀer and each may be made up of a relatively homogenous popula-
tion group, but note that self-employed, public sector employees, apprentices, and the
non-working population are included in the control group as well as in both treatment
groups. The only population group that is not considered at all is underage respondents
and private-sector PHI insured people, the latter representing less than ﬁve percent of
the German population. In light of this and the fact that the estimates are amazingly
robust to various model speciﬁcations, we believe that our results are representative and
generalizable for Germany, the third largest economy in the world and the most populous
country in Europe.
At ﬁrst sight, it may be surprising that the increase in copayments had such a large
eﬀect and that we have not found evidence of an impact of the cut in sick pay and
the new possibility for an employer to deduct two days of paid vacation for every ﬁve
days of treatment. We have several explanations for this. First, according to union
leaders, around half of the German workforce was de facto not aﬀected by the laws that
stipulated the sick pay decrease based on collective wage agreements between employers
and unions. We are not able to identify employees who were subject to such wage
agreements. However, even if only half of the respondents were aﬀected, one would
expect to measure an eﬀect. This may not be the case given that, second, the tightening
of the conditions did not necessarily pose a limitation on most eligible persons. It could
have been irrelevant since the majority may have faced a decision between going to
rehabilitation or simply staying home to recover from the illness or accident. In any case,
the patient would have been on sick leave. If necessary, physicians usually recommend
inpatient treatment, but if patients prefer to stay at home on sick leave, their wishes
are usually respected. Third, the cut in sick pay or in vacation days may also not have
been a binding constraint as many employees take all or part of their paid vacation
to go to a health spa or to rehabilitation in any case. Although entitled to take paid
leave in addition to their paid vacation, many employees fear negative job consequences,
22especially when unemployment rates are high. The only population groups that are
either autonomous or in a secure job are self-employed and public sector workers, both
of whom are not in Treatment Group 3, which is used to estimate the eﬀect. Finally, the
only group that was aﬀected only by the cut in sick pay was the group of PHI-insured
private sector employees. We deﬁned them as Treatment Group 4 and contrasted them
to Control Group 1 by estimating the same econometric speciﬁcations as for the other
treatment groups.15 We were unable to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant reform eﬀects, which conﬁrms
on the one hand our previous results. On the other hand, this may be due to the small
sample size since Treatment Group 4 is made up of only about 140 observations per year.
Although measurement errors might have slightly biased our results, all our esti-
mates are in line with the previous literature (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). Despite
the usage of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and diﬀerent subgroups to derive these ef-
fects, the calculated elasticities are remarkably similar, which strengthens the credibility
and identiﬁcation of the reform eﬀects. In all our speciﬁcations, we consistently found
that pull-forward eﬀects were of importance. Moreover, these anticipation eﬀects are
of the same size throughout all models and ﬁt the estimated fraction of well-informed
SHI-insured people who take regular advantage of the legal possibilities for receiving
convalescent care.
Although we have only indirectly calculated them under a few assumptions, we are the
ﬁrst to present elasticity estimates for preventive care. While the oﬀered computation
range is broad, it is narrow enough to state that the price elasticity for health spa
treatments is very likely to be elastic, which is again in line with the literature (Ringel
et al., 2002).
All in all, our setup produces various price elasticity estimates that all stem from
distinct exogenous price variations of a single cost-sharing parameter without having
the issue of treatment-related selection. The crosschecking of our results by means of
four diﬀerent outcome measures, combined with diﬀerent treatment and control groups
and various robustness checks, produces notably robust and plausible price elasticity
estimates. Hence, we are conﬁdent of having obtained, for the ﬁrst time, reliable price
elasticity estimates for convalescent care treatments.
What has been reduced: moral hazard or necessary preventive
care?
Before the reforms became eﬀective, experts claimed that around a quarter of all health
spa and rehabilitation treatments were unnecessary (Schmitz, 1996; Sauga, 1996). Moral
hazard was one central argument for politicians to increase the copayments.
15 The results are not displayed but available from the author upon request.
23According to our estimates, the total demand for convalescent care programs fell
between 20 and 25 percent as a response to the reforms. This ﬁts quite well with
the a priori estimated degree of moral hazard. It also makes sense that prior to the
reform, around 20 percent of the average convalescent care users went into therapy at
the minimum legally deﬁned time intervals although this qualifying period did not bind
them in case of necessary medical reasons. Although it is unlikely that morally hazardous
behavior was totally eliminated by the reforms, it is probably that the majority of the
decrease is due to a reduction in moral hazard having thereby led to greater eﬃciency
in the convalescent care market.
On the other hand, if medically necessary therapies were not administered, this may
have led to adverse health outcomes. Especially in case of preventive care, it is diﬃ-
cult to balance the prevailing degree of moral hazard against potential long-term health
improvements that reduce health expenditures and exert positive external eﬀects. Ac-
cording to our estimates, the demand for health spa treatments is elastic and thus the
reform-induced reduction in demand was largest for health spa programs. Although there
is ongoing discussion about the (long-term) eﬀects of health spa treatments among public
health and medical scientists, several studies have found distinct positive health eﬀects.
Patients with chronic diseases experienced reductions in pain and blood pressure, and for
a sample of employees, beneﬁcial eﬀects on physical and particularly mental health, such
as improved sleep quality, were found (Sekine et al., 2006; Cimbiz et al., 2005; Constant
et al., 1998). However, there are no studies based on controlled clinical trials to evaluate
the long-term eﬀects of health spa programs.
7 Conclusion
The question of the price elasticity of demand for health services has kept health econo-
mists busy since the discipline came into being. The RAND Health Insurance Exper-
iment, which was conducted in the 1970s, has led to tremendous advancements in the
ﬁeld thanks to the sound and innovative methodology employed.
This study evaluates how several German policy reforms – an increase in copayments,
a cut in sick pay, and the possibility for an employer to cut paid vacation – have aﬀected
the demand for medical rehabilitation treatment and health spa programs. We sepa-
rately assess the impact of these reform elements on the demand for diﬀerent forms of
convalescent care. First, we estimate the overall reform-induced change in demand for
convalescent care programs. Second, we calculate the demand eﬀects for rehabilitation
programs for recovery from severe illnesses that threaten patients’ work capacity. Third,
we present estimates showing how the demand for rehabilitation due to work accidents
reacted, and ﬁnally, how the demand for health spa programs has changed. To our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst study to compute price elasticities for these health services. Due to
24the two-track German health care system, our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates rely on
a sound control group and several treatment groups which were aﬀected diﬀerently by
the policy changes. The panel structure of the data allows us to take into account the
sample composition and to control for panel attrition. Moreover, selection into or out of
the treatment is not an issue due to strict legislative regulations in Germany.
We show that the increase in copayments from DM 12 (e6.14) to DM 25 (e12.78)
per day, together with a cut in sick pay and the possibility for employers to shorten paid
vacation, has led to an overall decrease in the demand for convalescent care of around
1.4 percentage points. This corresponds to a decline in total demand of approximately
25 percent. The data suggest that about a ﬁfth of the decrease can be explained by
pull-forward eﬀects so that the pure reform eﬀect lies around 20 percent. According
to our calculations, the price elasticity for rehabilitation therapies that avert imminent
total or partial occupational invalidities amounts to around -0.15. The elasticity for
rehabilitation treatments that help in recovering from work accidents lies around -0.30.
In contrast to that, the price elasticity for health spa treatments that can be categorized
as preventive care is elastic and lies between -1 and -2.5. All estimates are in line with the
literature. Moreover, they are plausible and remarkably insensitive to alternate model
speciﬁcations as well as various robustness checks. Hence, we are conﬁdent of having
obtained, for the ﬁrst time ever, reliable price elasticity estimates for various forms of
convalescent care programs including the ﬁrst elasticity estimate for preventive care.
The question to which degree such policy reforms reduce primarily moral hazard or
lead to adverse health outcomes is diﬃcult to quantify and is beyond the scope of this
paper. It should be the subject of further research.
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28Figure 1: Incidence Rate of Convalescent Care Treatments by Treatment Group










Private sector employees with SHI (1) yes yes yes
Self-employed with SHI (2) yes no no
Non-working with SHI (3) yes no no
Public sector employees with SHI (4) yes no no
Apprentices with SHI (5) yes no no
Self-employed with PHI (6) no no no
Non-working with PHI (7) no no no
Public sector employees with PHI (8) no no no
Apprentices with PHI (9) no no no
Table 2: Overview Treatment and Control Groups
Estimated Eﬀect Treatment group Control group
Net eﬀect subgroups (1)-(5) subgroups (6) - (9)
= Treatment Group 1 = Control Group 1
Eﬀect of copayment increase subgroups (2)-(5) subgroups (6) - (9)
= Treatment Group 2 = Control Group 1
Eﬀect of cut in sick pay and paid vacation subgroup (1) subgroups (2) - (5)
= Treatment Group 3 = Control Group 2









Rehab 0.032 0.040 0.045 0.032
Personal characteristics
Female 0.364 0.530 0.614 0.397
Age 44.904 44.215 47.055 39.659
Age squared 2,231 2,237 2,576 1,693
Immigrant 0.064 0.189 0.170 0.220
East Germany 0.134 0.285 0.309 0.246
Partner 0.745 0.720 0.671 0.798
Children 0.404 0.405 0.364 0.470
Good health 0.610 0.515 0.463 0.598
Bad health 0.110 0.164 0.201 0.106
Educational characteristics
Dropout 0.027 0.064 0.073 0.051
Degree after 8 years of schooling 0.206 0.403 0.425 0.368
Degree after 10 years of schooling 0.299 0.287 0.267 0.319
Degree after 12 years of schooling 0.049 0.029 0.025 0.034
Degree after 13 years of schooling 0.387 0.113 0.113 0.112
Other degree 0.027 0.092 0.077 0.116
Job characteristics
Full-time employed 0.671 0.440 0.197 0.831
Part-time employed 0.053 0.078 0.046 0.130
Marginally employed 0.008 0.021 0.010 0.040
Gross income per month 2,126 1,095 618 1,860
Regional unemployment rate 11.031 12.083 12.317 11.706
N 4,261 61,288 37,758 23,530
31Table 4: Determinants of the Demand for Health Spa and Rehabilitation Programs
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Personal characteristics
Female (d) -0.0006 0.002
Age 0.0023*** 0.000
Age square/100 -0.0017*** 0.000
Immigrant (d) -0.0058** 0.002
East Germany (d) 0.0014 0.007
Partner (d) -0.0025 0.002
Children (d) -0.0014 0.002
Good health (d) -0.0228*** 0.002
Bad health (d) 0.0397*** 0.003
Educational characteristics
Degree after 8 years’ schooling (d) 0.0044 0.004
Degree after 10 years’ schooling (d) 0.0100** 0.004
Degree after 12 years’ schooling (d) 0.0108 0.007
Degree after 13 years’ schooling (d) 0.0047 0.004
Other degree (d) 0.0046 0.004
Job characteristics
Full-time employed (d) 0.0015 0.002
Part-time employed (d) -0.0036 0.003
Marginally employed (d) -0.0034 0.005
Gross wage per month/100 -0.0002** 0.000
Regional unemployment rate 0.0002 0.001
Year 1997 (d) 0.0018 0.002




(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
marginal eﬀects, which are calculated at the means of the covariates, are displayed
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent went to health spa or rehab
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id
Regression includes state dummies
Left out reference categories are dropout and non-employed
32Table 5: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimation with Pooled Sample













DiD (d) -0.0120** -0.0136** 0.0017 -0.0093* -0.0109* 0.0024
(0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0024) (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0026)
Treatment dummy (d) 0.0054** 0.0051* 0.0010 0.0036 0.0028 0.0007
(T1, T2, or T3) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0024)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0964 0.0901 0.0956 0.0952 0.0890 0.0945
χ2 1555 992 1455 1287 826 1200
N 65549 42019 61288 52925 33975 49432
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal eﬀects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for T1 (T2, T3)(=1) and DiD(=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent went to health spa or rehabilitation; every column represents one probit model
Column (1) and (4) use T1, column (2) and (5) use T2, and column (3) and (6) use T3 (see Section 3 for further details)
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person idTable 6: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimation with Balanced Sample













DiD (d) -0.0125** -0.0153** 0.0044 -0.0107* -0.0135* 0.0013
(0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0029) (0.0063) (0.0074) (0.0036)
Treatment dummy (d) 0.0058** 0.0057* -0.0001 0.0031 0.0025 -0.0161***
(T1, T2, or T3) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0038)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0920 0.0869 0.0914 0.0908 0.0856 0.0080
χ2 1141 744 1068 954 618 89
N 48813 30625 45557 39479 24812 36823
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal eﬀects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for T1 (T2, T3)(=1) and DiD(=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent went to health spa or rehabilitation; every column represents one probit model
Column (1) and (4) use T1, column (2) and (5) use T2, and column (3) and (6) use T3 (see Section 3 for further details)
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person idTable 7: Working population: Medical Rehabilitation due to Illness vs. Medical Rehabilitation due to Accident











DiD (d) -0.0026* -0.0021 -0.0007 -0.0004* -0.0007*
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0004)
[0.0808] [0.1825] [0.6605] [0.0943] [0.0766]
Treatment dummy (d) -0.0079*** -0.0116*** 0.0019***
(T1, T2, or T3) (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0007)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.1270 0.1188 0.1296 0.0843 0.0725
χ2 771 425 681 100 88
N 50722 32267 47371 34084 34101
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal eﬀects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for T1 (T2, T3)(=1) and DiD(=1) in columns (1) to (3)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable in ﬁrst three columns: dummy that is 1 if respondent had a rehabilitation stay to prevent work incapacity and which was paid by the SPI
Sample size in columns (1) to (3) drops in comparison to Table 5 since the year 1998 cannot be used due to missing information
Dependent variable in column (4): dummy that is 1 if respondent had a rehabilitation stay and a work accident that required a hospital stay
Dependent variable in column (5): dummy that is 1 if respondent had a rehabilitation stay and a work accident that required medical treatment but no hospital stay
Columns (4) and (5): only Treatmentgroup 1 (subsamples (1)-(5)) is used in as before-after estimation setting
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person id















DiD (d) -0.0180* -0.0125** -0.0127** -0.0092** -0.0055 -0.0119** -0.0148***
(0.0098) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0054) (0.0054 )
T2 0.0085** 0.0050 0.0047 0.0035* 0.0010 0.0045** 0.0035
(0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) 0.0028
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0941 0.0906 0.0902 0.0665 0.1133 0.0861 0.0932
χ2 483 923 969 502 691 633 678
N 16935 38962 42019 41258 40991 32801 29781
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal eﬀects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for T2(=1) and DiD(=1)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent went to health spa or rehabilitation; every column represents one probit model
All speciﬁcations use T2, i.e. contrast Treatment Group 2 to Control Group 1 and thus estimate the pure copayment eﬀect
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person idTable 9: Placebo Estimates
Variable Net eﬀect Copayment eﬀect Sick pay cut eﬀect
DiD 1996 (d) -0.0023 -0.0035 0.0022
(0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0023)
DiD 1995 (d) -0.0003 -0.0009 0.0003
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0027)
Educational characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Regional unemployment rate yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.0952 0.0954 0.0895 0.0893 0.0964 0.0943
χ2 1552 1556 993 993 1450 1448
N 65549 65549 42019 42019 61288 61288
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Marginal eﬀects are calculated at the means of the covariates except for T1 (T2, T3)(=1) and DiD(=1) in columns (1) to (3)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable: dummy that is 1 if respondent went to health spa or rehabilitation; every column represents one probit model
Column (1) and (2) use T1, column (2) and (3) use T2, and column (4) and (5) use T3 (see Section 3 for further details)
DiD 95 is the interaction term between T1 (T2, T3) and a pseudo post-reform dummy that takes on the value 1 for the years 1995-1998
DiD 96 is the interaction term between T1 (T2, T3) and a pseudo post-reform dummy that takes on the value 1 for the years 1996-1998
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on person idTable 10: Price Elasticity Estimates for Diﬀerent Convalescent Care Programs
Rehabilitation and
health spa programs
Rehab due to illness









1994-1998 -0.30 up to -0.45 -0.11 up to -0.24 -0.31 up to -0.42 -0.45 up to -0.55 -1.26 up to -3.02
1996 excluded -0.22 up to -0.34 -0.06 up to -0.19 -0.22 up to -0.34 -0.25 up to -0.37 -1.03 up to -2.52
West Germany: -0.32 up to -0.42 -0.18 up to -0.31 -0.32 up to -0.45 -0.28 up to -0.41 -1.15 up to -2.81
1996 excluded
Arc Price Elasticities are displayed which were calculated according to εq,p =
(q1−q0)/¯ q
(p1−p0)/¯ p
Under consideration that copayments were increased by (25-12/[(25+12)/2]= 70.27 percent in West and (20-8/[(20+8)/2]= 85.71 percent in East Germany and by assuming
that 18.8 percent of all therapies were undertaken by East Germans between 1994 and 1998 (not needed for row three) (German Statutory Pension Insurance, 2008).
Under consideration that 15.13 percent of all programs were health spa programs from 1994 until 1998 (German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008).
Under consideration that 8.14 percent of all programs were outpatient health spa programs from 1994 until 1998 (German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2008).Appendix A
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Rehab 0.0393 0.194 0 1 65549
Rehab due to illness 0.0116 0.107 0 1 63711
Rehab due to accident:
w/o hospital stay 0.0017 0.042 0 1 34101
with hospital stay 0.0012 0.035 0 1 34084
Personal characteristics
Female 0.52 0.5 0 1 65549
Age 44.26 16.659 18 99 65549
Age squared 2236 1625 324 9801 65549
Immigrant 0.181 0.385 0 1 65549
East Germany 0.275 0.447 0 1 65549
Partner 0.721 0.448 0 1 65549
Children 0.405 0.491 0 1 65549
Good health 0.521 0.5 0 1 65549
Bad health 0.161 0.367 0 1 65549
Educational characteristics
Drop out 0.062 0.241 0 1 65549
Degree after 8 years’ schooling 0.39 0.488 0 1 65549
Degree after 10 years’ schooling 0.288 0.453 0 1 65549
Degree after 12 years’ schooling 0.03 0.17 0 1 65549
Degree after 13 years’ schooling 0.131 0.337 0 1 65549
Other degree 0.088 0.283 0 1 65486
Job characteristics
Full-time employed 0.455 0.498 0 1 65549
Part-time employed 0.077 0.266 0 1 65549
Marginally employed 0.02 0.141 0 1 65549
Gross wage per month 1162 1301 0 51129 65549
Regional unemployment rate 12.014 3.899 7 21.7 65486
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